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Abstract
The capability approach has recently been used in Australian Indigenous 
policy formation. Of particular note is how it has been used in some 
instances to justify current paternalistic and directive policies for Indigenous 
Australians. These include behavioural conditionalities on state support 
and income management—policy apparatuses that aim to create individual 
responsibility and to re-engineer the social norms of Indigenous people. 
This interpretation of the capability approach is at odds with the writings 
of Sen, because it overlooks the core concepts of freedom, agency and 
pluralism. To examine this tension, this paper reviews the contestation 
between capability scholars and commentators on Indigenous policy, paying 
particular attention to four areas: human capability vs human capital, deficit 
discourse, individual responsibility, and the ends and means of policy. Finally, 
to reinvigorate the capability approach in Australian Indigenous policy, six 
areas are suggested in which the capability approach could be used in the 
future.
Keywords: capability approach, Indigenous policy, responsibility, freedom, 
agency, pluralism
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The capability approach has recently gained some prominence in Australian Indigenous policy 
discussions and formulations. Of particular note is 
how the approach has been used in some instances 
to justify current paternalistic and directive policies 
for Indigenous Australians—specifically, the use of 
behavioural requirements relating to state assistance and 
compulsory income management. These paternalistic 
policies aim to create individual responsibility and to 
re-engineer the social norms of Indigenous people. 
These sets of contemporary policies are situated within 
what some describe as the current neoliberal and 
neopaternal swing of social policy in Australia more 
generally (Altman 2010, Neale 2013, Stanford & Taylor 
2013). Whereas paternalistic policies restrict a person’s 
liberty and autonomy for the sake of their own good 
(Deneulin 2002), neopaternalism is focused primarily 
on soft power and shaping subjectivities, specifically 
attempting to ‘control peoples’ patterns of behaviour in 
what are perceived to be their own interests’ (Buckmaster 
et al. 2012:18). A feature of both paternalistic and 
neopaternalistic approaches is that the ends justify the 
means. Paternalism is in stark contrast to the capability 
approach, where Sen and other capability scholars 
actively eschew paternalism. Within the capability 
approach, the means of policy is just as important as the 
ends (Sen 1999, Alkire 2002, Nussbaum 2011).
Although there is no definitive account of the capability 
approach agreed to by all capability scholars, the 
concepts of freedom, agency and pluralism underpin 
the approach. That the approach has been implicated in 
what some suggest are paternalistic measures calls for 
an analysis of its interpretation in Australian Indigenous 
policy. I will argue that the interpretations of the capability 
approach used in Indigenous policy in Australia have 
overlooked the core concepts of freedom, agency and 
pluralism, and are inconsistent with Sen’s account.
To make such an argument, I will firstly provide an 
overview of the capability approach. I will then discuss 
the use of the capability literature in Australian Indigenous 
policy, highlighting some of the tensions with capability 
theory, and conclude by suggesting some avenues 
where a full reading of the capability approach could help 
orientate the policy landscape towards social justice and 
Indigenous self-determination.
The capability approach
The capability approach is a normative evaluative 
framework in which social arrangements should be 
analysed for their ability to support capabilities. It 
emerged after Sen (1979) showed how contemporary 
political and moral philosophy writings on equality did not 
sufficiently answer the fundamental question ‘inequality 
of what?’ In response to the works of John Rawls (1971), 
Ronald Dworkin (1981a,b), Thomas Nagel (1979) and 
Thomas Scanlon (1988), Sen (1995) argued that normative 
theories of justice, deprivation and inequality always 
required the equality of something—equality of liberty, 
resources or utility. Sen’s argument was that focusing 
on equality in this way overlooked the heterogeneity and 
diversity of people: the many different ways in which 
equality can be judged. For example, by just focusing on 
particular resources (e.g. liberty or economic resources), 
it was not clear that all people, given differing abilities, 
would be able to convert such resources into personal 
gain (Sen 1995).
Sen instead proposed that social arrangements should 
be assessed as human freedoms, where human 
freedoms are not just the achievement of functionings 
people value or have reason to value but also the ability 
of people to pursue them in the first place. Functionings 
are actual beings and doings people may undertake—for 
example, being nourished, riding a bike, being educated 
and being healthy. Capabilities are the real ability or 
freedom to achieve sets of functionings—for example, the 
ability to be nourished, the ability to be educated and the 
ability to be healthy. Put another way, capabilities are the 
freedoms people have to undertake doings and beings 
(functionings) they ‘value and have reason to value’ (Sen 
2009:276). Consequently, economic and social policy 
should exist as ‘a process of expanding the substantive 
freedoms that people have’ (Sen 1999:297).
In this sense, economic advancement is only pursued as 
a means to the end of human wellbeing. This approach 
stands in contrast to other normative development 
approaches that see human beings as ends to economic 
growth. Development as utility maximisation is also 
queried within the capability literature (where utility is 
defined as pleasure, desire or happiness), because utility 
does not account for adaptive preferences and can 
be restrictive when making interpersonal appraisals of 
deprivation or wellbeing (Sen 1995).
The application of the capability approach in Australian 
Indigenous policy has diverged from the broader corpus 
of the capability literature, which is founded on three 
central concepts: freedom, agency and pluralism. I will 
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discuss the use of freedom, agency and pluralism by 
capability scholars, before going on to examine how 
these three concepts have been interpreted differently 
in contemporary Australian Indigenous policy. What 
follows illuminates how such different interpretations 
have led to very different sets of policies. By highlighting 
the conflicting interpretations, I aim to enable a more 
accurate application of the capability approach within 
Indigenous policy in Australia.
Sen’s notion of freedom
Within the capability approach, Sen defines freedom in 
two distinct ways. Firstly, he explains the usefulness of 
expanding human freedoms through opportunities or the 
‘substantive freedoms’ (Sen 1999:3) that the members 
of a society enjoy. Secondly, Sen defines freedom 
through empowerment and agency, which he calls 
‘process freedoms’ (Sen 2002:625). Process freedoms 
are the freedom for people to undertake initiatives they 
value—it requires their agency. Process freedoms are 
important because they ‘enhance the ability of people to 
help themselves and also to influence the world, these 
matters are central to the process of development’ 
(Sen 1999:18). Sen also considers agency and systemic 
process freedoms such as public deliberation, and civil 
and political liberties to be central in creating social 
change, where the process of achieving such freedoms 
has intrinsic importance, independent of the outcome. 
Through defining freedom in these two distinct ways, the 
distinction between achievement of outcomes and ability 
to achieve outcomes becomes clearer. In the capability 
approach, the means are just as important as the ends of 
development and related policies.
Agency
Often, policy is reduced to include just the realisation of 
functionings (outcomes or beings and doings, as used by 
capability scholars). Sen’s addition of agency means that 
the process of policy is just as important as the outcome. 
Agency to Sen means that there is freedom for people 
to achieve particular outcomes if they are desired and 
valued. Sen (1999:53) states, ‘the people have to be seen 
… as being actively involved—given the opportunity—
in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive 
recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs’. 
Agency is the ability to act on values or, as Sen puts it, 
‘what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of 
whatever goals or values he or she regards as important’ 
(Sen 1985a:203).
Although Sen uses a narrow definition of agency, focusing 
mainly on agency that is purposeful and goal directed 
(Klein 2014), his commitment to process freedoms 
being at the heart of all processes of development and 
social change is significant. The proposition is that 
(Alkire 2008:29):
social arrangements should be primarily evaluated 
according to the extent of freedom people 
have to promote or achieve functionings they 
value. Put simply, progress, or development, or 
poverty reduction, occurs when people have 
greater freedoms.
When thinking about Australian Indigenous policy, the 
key question from the capability approach lens becomes, 
precisely, how free are Indigenous Australians to live the 
lives they value and have reason to value?
According to Sen (1999), agency applies to action at 
both individual and collective levels. The individual level 
refers to an individual acting on what they value or have 
reason to value. The collective level refers to democratic 
deliberation, public reasoning and collective movements. 
Sen calls for participatory public deliberation as being 
fundamental, and a ‘procedural rather than a normative 
response’ (Alkire 2002:143). What this means is that 
institutions and structures need to be procedurally just, 
and not solely outcome focused. Consequently, there is 
a clear divergence between the capability approach and 
neopaternalistic policies within Australian Indigenous 
policy. The capability approach maintains that the 
process of policy is just as important as the outcome.
Pluralism
Human diversity is a driving force behind Sen’s initial 
work on inequality. Following this, capability scholars 
maintain that processes of development should be 
plural and never uniform or predetermined, overriding 
the needs of differing cultural and social contexts (see 
Sen 1995, Alkire 2002, Nussbaum 2011). In particular, 
Sen purposefully avoids articulating any specific set of 
capabilities, calling for the need for process freedoms 
such as agency and public deliberation to help identify 
lists of capabilities for specific social milieus. Explicitly, 
Sen’s capability approach aims to only specify ‘a space 
in which evaluation is to take place, rather than proposing 
one particular formula for evaluation’ (Sen 1988:18). For 
Sen, the whole notion of making value judgments by 
listing important capabilities competes with the pluralism 
that he values and defends.
Notwithstanding, pluralism in the capability approach 
rests heavily on democracy, deliberative processes, and 
the ability of groups and institutions to fairly compile lists. 
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The risk, of course, is that already marginalised voices 
again will be isolated in such a process. In the case of 
Indigenous Australians, this is particularly poignant—it is 
precisely the democratic institutions of settler society that 
have continually colonised them (Wolfe 1999).
Nussbaum takes a different approach to pluralism, 
whereby she argues that it is precisely because there is a 
risk that marginalised voices will be ignored by the wider 
populace in democratic processes that a broad list of 
10 universal capabilities must be identified. Nussbaum 
(2006) argues that her list of innate capabilities is broad 
enough to be relevant to all societies and cultures. The 
list includes the capabilities of life; bodily health; bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and 
control over one’s environment. The applicability of such 
a list, she argues, ‘isolates those human capabilities that 
can be convincingly argued to be of central importance 
in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or 
chooses’ (Nussbaum 2001:74). Yet Nussbaum, trying 
to safeguard capabilities to ensure cultural and social 
integrity, and to ensure that the approach is as pragmatic 
as possible for policy makers, still risks paternalism 
(Deneulin 2002). By identifying what she sees as 
10 capabilities that are universally applicable, Nussbaum 
endorses a level of homogeneity within the capability 
approach. This can be illustrated through the inclusion of 
‘practical reason’ as one of the universal capabilities. This 
capability has strong roots in the western philosophical 
tradition, and can exclude and compete against 
other philosophies and world views (Robeyns 2003, 
Charusheela 2009).
Furthermore, such a universal list brings up specific 
problems relating to Indigenous justice in Australia. 
Altman (2009) illustrates the problems with universal 
lists in Australian Indigenous policy by showing that 
creating lists runs the risk of privileging dominant and 
mainstream ideas of valuable beings and doings. One 
example is the reduction of Indigenous wellbeing to a 
non-Indigenous set of socioeconomic indicators, as 
found in current government policy frameworks. While a 
universal list has pragmatic attractiveness and makes it 
easy for policy makers to articulate specific capabilities 
to focus on, it would seem that Sen’s version of the 
capability approach better reflects the ideals of agency, 
pluralism and freedom. Sen maintains that having a 
universal list of basic capabilities misses the opportunity 
for public deliberation and democratic process freedoms 
in compiling lists. This concerns Sen because, not only 
are the instrumental value and rights of those who will 
be affected by the policy overlooked, so is the intrinsic 
value of including people in the processes affecting 
their lives (Sen 1999). Although many are sympathetic 
to Nussbaum’s approach, Sen’s version is most widely 
applied in development policy.
Social structures, power and 
the capability approach
Sen is not ignorant of the complexity between structures, 
culture and agency. He has written about the human 
rights–based approach and the capability approach 
being mutually reinforcing (Sen 2005, 2009). Specifically, 
human rights can play a role in holding states and 
institutions to account by providing valued capabilities 
to the people they represent. For example, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples sets a standard to direct and hold democratic 
institutions in Australia to account. While many human 
rights complement capabilities, in some cases process 
freedoms in the achievement of such human rights can 
actually be overlooked (as some rights can be forced 
on people). One such example of the possible tension 
between the human rights approach and the capability 
approach is the enforcement of the right to work, 
where people are coerced by welfare-to-work policies 
into employment.
Although Sen has an implicit concern with power relations 
and unjust social structures, caution must nonetheless 
be used when applying collective process freedoms 
such as deliberation and democracy. This is because 
unjust relations of power and social structures can be 
reproduced through collective process freedoms without 
a full account and theorisation of societal structures, 
hegemony and power in the shaping of agency and 
society (Otto & Ziegler 2006, Zheng & Stahl 2011). To 
put it differently, the racialised, liberal and economic 
constitution of society tends to structure agents’ options, 
and hegemony acts to exclude other options (Gramsci 
1971, Laclau & Mouffe 2001). Critical social theories could 
remedy such a dilemma and complement the capability 
approach as they specifically focus on the structural 
conditions of, and dialectic with, individual and collective 
agency. Moreover, critical social theory scholars focus 
their research on how social structures and power 
dynamics enable or restrict emancipation—that is, 
the discursive character of social structures that limit 
personal and collective freedoms (Zheng & Stahl 2011). 
Without such critical social theory, the pluralism and 
flexibility built into the capability approach ‘creates scope 
for more casual and indeed opportunistic appropriations 
and interpretations’ (Sayer 2012:582).
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The use of the capability approach 
in Australian Indigenous policy
Since the 1990s and the turn of the 21st century, there 
has been a movement away from ‘human diversity and 
choice’, turning back to guardianship principles in policy 
(Sanders 2009). Influential in this shift have been the 
writings of Noel Pearson, especially his monograph 
Our right to take responsibility (2000), and the Cape 
York Institute’s From hand out to hand up (CYI 2007). 
Pearson argues that past government welfare policies 
have created a ‘passive welfare’ (Pearson 2000:21) 
dependence because they required no reciprocity 
from Indigenous peoples. The argument follows that 
contemporary policy targeting Indigenous peoples 
must now champion ‘responsibility and reciprocity’. 
Interventions following this logic emphasise the individual 
taking responsibility for their life, and place less emphasis 
on the failure of the state and services to provide support 
to Indigenous people to live the lives they value.
Pearson (2000) and the Cape York Institute (CYI 2007) 
drew on the writings of Sen (1999) in Development 
as freedom to propose contentious welfare reforms 
to instil responsibility. Reforms included attaching 
behavioural conditions to welfare payments, and using 
income management and activation strategies to get 
children in school, and Indigenous people in training 
and what Pearson calls ‘real jobs’. Pearson used Sen’s 
writings to justify the need to create a sense of individual 
responsibility and to establish basic capabilities in 
the communities, all through paternalistic measures. 
The reforms were initially trialled, with Australian and 
Queensland government funding, in four Indigenous 
communities in Cape York, far north Queensland; the trial 
is known as the Cape York Reform Trial.
Since being published, Pearson’s welfare reform program 
has enjoyed broad support within the Australian and 
state and territory bureaucracies and governments. 
These policy actors in various iterations have used the 
ideas from the Cape York Reform Trial in their broader 
Indigenous policies. Furthermore, the influential ideas 
of Pearson underpin the development logic used in 
the Empowered Communities initiative (Empowered 
Communities 2015). This initiative, headed by Pearson, 
aims to extend the Cape York Reform Trial in a further 
seven Indigenous communities across Australia. Finally, 
the 2014 Forrest review also draws heavily from Pearson’s 
approach in its highly controversial national Indigenous 
employment and training review. The Forrest review 
accepts Pearson’s welfare reform strategies as a key 
way to accelerate Indigenous participation in work and 
training (Forrest 2014).
Although supposedly informed by Sen’s work on the 
capability approach, these policies are inconsistent with 
his writings and the broader international community of 
capabilities scholars because they miss its core concepts 
of freedom, agency and pluralism. Given the influence of 
Pearson, and the shift in contemporary Indigenous policy 
towards neopaternalism and economic rationalism, there 
is a need to examine interpretations of the capability 
approach and clarify tensions. This will open up new 
avenues for the capability approach to be appropriately 
applied to Indigenous policy in Australia.
Four major deviations from Sen’s notions of capabilities in 
the context of Australian Indigenous policy are explored 
in detail below.
Human capability, not human capital
One significant misreading of Sen’s approach in 
Australian Indigenous policy is the conflation of 
human capital with human capabilities. For example, 
in the Forrest review, the author articulates the aim 
to ‘build capabilities, dismantling the cash barbeque 
and eliminating disincentives’ (Forrest 2014:vi). The 
‘cash barbeque’ refers to the perceived wasting of 
resources on initiatives providing opportunities for 
Indigenous people to pursue valued capabilities beyond 
workforce integration. The Forrest review lists more 
than 200 recommendations to build human capital in 
Indigenous people. Underpinning the Forrest review is the 
belief that Indigenous wellbeing is best achieved through 
integrating people into the market economy. Although 
it is fair to argue that the choice to take part in the 
Australian market economy could be a valued capability, 
the argument that valued capabilities are only those 
providing human capital is a distortion of Sen’s ideas. 
Sen (1999:295–296) himself argues that ‘human beings 
are not merely means of production, but also the end of 
the exercise’. Thus, capabilities cannot be restricted to 
what is necessary to feed the growth economy. Instead, 
what is most vital to human flourishing are capabilities 
that people value and have reason to value, which may or 
may not be capitalist in function. Instead, development is 
freedom: the freedom to live valued lives.
Deficit discourse and ‘lacking’ capabilities
Many policy actors have an underlying belief that 
Indigenous agency is severely lacking and that social 
norms of Indigenous people need to be changed 
(Buckmaster et al. 2012). This ‘deficit discourse’ is a 
mode of thinking that frames Indigenous agency in a 
narrative of negativity and insufficiency (Fforde et al. 
2013). In the context of Australian Indigenous policy, 
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policy initiatives firmly placed in a discourse of deficit 
can be wary, disparaging and dismissive of Indigenous 
agency, and efforts to create social and personal change. 
Furthermore, deficit discourse can be paternalistic, 
involving a misinterpretation of the capability approach, 
and the justification of behavioural requirements on state 
assistance and related sanctions.
In his 2011 lecture at Griffith University, public intellectual 
Noel Pearson (2011) stated:
In the words of Amartya Sen, ‘the capabilities [are 
those] to choose lives they have reason to value’. 
That is why we champion welfare reform. Because we 
want our people to have capabilities to choose lives 
they have reason to value.
Yet the capability literature shows a major divergence 
from Pearson, where there is a dialectic between the 
‘lives people value’ and the ‘lives people have reason 
to value’. In the capability approach, both need to be 
deliberated and debated in the public domain. Pearson, 
in focusing on the phrase ‘lives they have reason to 
value’, completely overlooks the process freedom of 
agency in living lives people actually value (see also 
Pearson 2005). Furthermore, in linking welfare reform and 
punitive measures with capability realisation, Pearson 
seems to suggest that Indigenous people either do not 
have capabilities or that the capabilities they do have are 
insufficient. Both dismiss Indigenous agency in two ways.
Firstly, the belief that Indigenous people do not have 
capabilities that could enable them to choose lives 
they value or have reason to value undervalues how 
everyday Indigenous people are agents. For example, 
Indigenous people negotiate the differing and sometimes 
competing needs and demands of both Aboriginal and 
settler societies every day. In her ethnography of the 
Ngaanyatjarra lands, traversing South Australia, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory, Inge Kral (2012:232) 
shows how Indigenous youth continually act in conflicting 
realities where they must ‘balance the pressure of local 
sociocultural obligations and the expectation that they 
will follow in the footsteps of the older generation, with 
the pressure to participate in wider Australian society’. 
Indigenous people constantly act as change agents 
to contest and shape the worlds around them. For 
example, Kral (2012) shows how young people under 
pressure to balance the ‘hybrid identities’ (232) of living 
in Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies are able to 
create change in their communities through engaging 
with new technologies. Further, Schwab and Kral (2014) 
document the Warlpiri people who, dissatisfied with the 
lack of mainstream adult education, made a commitment 
to invest a portion of royalty monies from mining 
activities into locally determined education, training 
and community development programs for people in 
their own communities. These ‘Learning Community 
Centres’ have become a benchmark in not only adult 
education but also Indigenous learning and community 
development more broadly.
Secondly, deficit discourse can overshadow many 
current capabilities held by Indigenous people, especially 
Indigenous people living on country. Living on country 
requires an array of highly refined and skilled capabilities 
such as (but not limited to) the ability and permission 
to have a spiritual connection to country; the ability to 
know the ways and stories of the country, including the 
people, animals and plants; and the ability to manage 
ecological systems of the country. Most importantly, 
such capabilities are central to people’s wellbeing. 
Dockery (2011) demonstrated a positive link between 
Indigenous Australians’ attachment to their traditional 
cultures and their wellbeing, asserting that traditional 
cultures need to be preserved and strengthened if 
wellbeing is to be improved. It can be disempowering 
and oppressive to overlook and undervalue valued 
capabilities just because they are not valued or seen as 
vital within Australian settler society. A contemporary film 
that beautifully illustrates this point is Charlie’s country, 
which skilfully depicts the range of capabilities held by 
the Indigenous man Charlie. Living in a remote part of 
Australia, Charlie has the ability to hunt, fish, care for 
country, have a spiritual connection with the land, speak 
his traditional language, tell the stories of the Dreamings, 
teach younger people traditional law, look after his family 
even though they have been forced off their land and 
placed in town camps, and negotiate the contestation 
of world views between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
actors. The tragedy that unfolds is the systematic 
and constant dismissal of Charlie’s capabilities and 
efforts by actors of white settler society, such as the 
police, service providers, government officials, medical 
professionals and the media. For Charlie and many other 
Indigenous Australians, particularly those living in remote 
communities, their capabilities are not recognised in 
mainstream policy debates as core to their wellbeing, 
especially compared with the ability to be literate in 
English, to be numerate, to hold employment in the 
mainstream labour market and to undertake workplace 
training. Rendering valued and highly refined capabilities 
invisible, or disciplining agency with punitive welfare 
reform measures undermines what valuable freedom 
means to many Indigenous people.
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Capability as individual responsibility
Where deficit discourse is the starting point for policy, 
there is an implicit expectation that Indigenous agency 
will be dysfunctional (Fforde et al. 2013). Consequently, 
policy makers and policy think tanks have identified 
the lack of individual responsibility as a key feature of 
Indigenous dysfunction in Australia. The writings of 
Sen have been used to justify these interpretations, but 
such interpretations should be treated with caution for 
two reasons.
Firstly, critiques of contemporary Indigenous policy 
seem to either misinterpret Sen’s writings or use them 
out of context. For example, authors from the Cape York 
Institute, which implemented welfare reform measures 
in far north Queensland communities, discussed Sen’s 
writings in From hand up to hand out: Cape York Welfare 
Reform Project (CYI 2007). In this report, capabilities are 
defined as ‘the sum of opportunity plus responsibility’ 
(CYI 2007:8), effectively reducing agency to responsibility. 
Yet Sen and other capability scholars regard capabilities 
as the ability or freedom to undertake doings and beings 
people value or have reason to value (Sen 1999). This 
is very different from responsibility, since to include 
responsibility in the definition of capabilities would 
imply there is a constant norm to be responsible—which 
would conflict with Sen’s commitment to plurality and 
agency. Sen (1999) does not dismiss responsibility, but 
he does not see it as an in-built and static functioning 
of capability sets. For Sen to justify the prominence of 
responsibility as a central capability, it could only be for 
a specific context that was justified through sufficient 
public deliberation. This has been shown not to be the 
case (Martin 2008). Sen (1999:284–285) qualifies his view 
on individual responsibility:
… the substantive freedoms that we respectively 
enjoy to exercise our responsibilities are extremely 
contingent on personal, social and environmental 
circumstances … The alternative to an exclusive 
reliance on individual responsibility is not, as is 
sometimes assumed, the so-called nanny state. 
There is a difference between ‘nannying’ and 
individual’s choices and creating more opportunity 
for choice and for substantive decisions for 
individuals who can then act responsibility on that 
basis … The arbitrarily narrow view of individual 
responsibility—with the individual standing on an 
imaginary island unhelped and unhindered by others 
—has to be broadened not merely by acknowledging 
the role of the state, but also by recognizing the 
functions of other institutions and agents.
What this passage shows is that, for Sen, individual 
responsibility necessitates opportunity freedoms and 
process freedoms. To Sen, this is applicable in both the 
global south and the global north (not just the global 
south, as inferred by Pearson [2007]). Therefore, placing 
the focus on the individual is inconsistent with Sen’s 
approach, which insists on two necessary preconditions 
of the individual if responsibility is to be demanded: 
‘adequate means and power to act and real freedom to 
choose one’s way of living’ (Bonvin 2008:368). According 
to the capability literature, people cannot be held 
responsible if they are not supported with the capacity 
to act. Specifically, ‘without the substantive freedom 
and capability to do something, a person cannot be 
responsible for doing it’ (Sen 1999:284). What this means 
is that, within the capability perspective, people cannot 
be sanctioned for not turning up to school if the school 
learning environment is inappropriate or oppressive. 
Similarly, sanctions on people for not being employed 
when there is limited or precarious employment 
are problematic.
Secondly, the push for individual responsibility in 
Indigenous policy has a tendency to follow on from the 
libertarian belief that Indigenous people (and all people) 
can be blamed for their situations. Yet Sen’s account 
of individual freedom does not define agency as free 
will and as separate from social processes, oppression 
and power (Sen 1999). Thus, individual irresponsibility 
as a failure of agency is completely at odds with Sen’s 
approach to agency and freedom. Sen’s understanding of 
social processes is far more sophisticated. He is acutely 
aware of the use of responsibility to further political 
agendas, where ‘that thought [individual responsibility], 
in one form or another, seems to move many political 
commentators and the idea of self-help fits well into 
the mood of the present times’ (Sen 1999:283). Bulloch 
and Fogarty (no date:9) show how the misinformed idea 
of development as freedom is being deployed ‘with 
a broader pre-existing set of discourses that entreat 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to conduct 
themselves as liberal subjects’. Specifically, there is an 
assumption that poverty and vulnerability stem from a 
failure to act in a responsible and disciplined manner—
‘the history of Indigenous affairs in Australia is replete 
with examples of paternal state practices intended to 
engineer free individuals’ (Bulloch & Fogarty, no date:11).
The alternative view is that Indigenous people’s agency 
is not irresponsible. It is that the functionings in the 
policy makers’ spotlight are enforced with little regard 
for the agency and values held by the people the 
policies are directed at. For example, if people felt that 
the types of schooling, training or employment offered 
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were valuable, they may turn up. Instead of forcing and 
coercing Indigenous people into very specific and narrow 
ideas of wellbeing, an alternative approach would be to 
place Indigenous agency at the centre of the process, 
developing policy and programs at a local level that are 
valued by the broad populace of Indigenous people.
Ends justify the means—imposing 
preselected ‘basic’ capabilities
The capability approach has also been used to justify 
the use of paternalistic measures to impose a set of 
predetermined ‘basic capabilities’. The Cape York 
Institute (CYI 2007) and Watt (2013) both argue that 
Sen has claimed that education and health are basic 
capabilities for choice. However, what is missed by these 
authors is that, when Sen has articulated any specific 
capability, he has only done so to illustrate how such a 
capability is important in a particular situation—it is not 
meant to be universally digested. Even Nussbaum with 
her universal list has advocated strongly for individual 
and collective process freedoms in the adoption of her 
broad list of 10 capabilities. To Sen, agency and freedom 
are paramount at both normative and descriptive levels. 
Two points relate to this.
Firstly, at a normative level, Sen has shown in his writings 
that, to put agency and people first in the process of 
development, no prescribed idea of universal ‘basic’ 
capabilities can be justified. Instead, Sen calls for the 
use of agency and public deliberation to grapple with 
what capabilities should be identified for context-specific 
situations. This is an argument that he has maintained 
with other prominent scholars such as Nussbaum for 
more than a decade (Sen 1985b, 1995, 1999, 2005, 
2009). The universalisation of capabilities is rejected by 
Sen (2005:158):
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, 
but with insisting on one pre-determined list of 
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general 
or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, 
emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the 
possibility of fruitful public participation on what 
should be included and why.
Yet the Cape York Institute (CYI 2007) advocates for basic 
standards of formal literacy and numeracy capabilities 
across Australia,1 referencing Sen to claim that they 
are basic and required to achieve other capabilities 
more generally. This argument has paved the way 
for using paternalistic means to achieve such ends, 
such as behavioural requirements attached to welfare, 
employment activation strategies, and sanctions such as 
income management.
Secondly, justifying the ends over the means denies 
the instrumental and intrinsic importance of agency 
and public deliberation in the policy process. Sen 
appreciates the ongoing reflective process in which sets 
of capabilities are formed. His account of the capability 
approach clearly shows that the process of development 
is just as critical as the outcomes produced. Yet broad 
and diverse Indigenous involvement and agency in 
the formation of policy are overlooked. For example, 
according to Phillip Martin (2008), an employee of Cape 
York Partnerships, the community engagement phase 
undertaken before the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial 
was proposed to the Queensland Government in 2007 
was a process more to convince local people of the 
merit of preconceived policies and principles than to 
inform the polices themselves, and allow deliberation 
and community participation in such discussions. 
Moreover, in the 2012 scoping study report for a 
program put forward by the Wunan Foundation (2012) 
as part of Empowered Communities, the five community 
requirements were discussed with only 2.35%2 of the 
Halls Creek Indigenous community members. These 
agreements required the opting-in of all Indigenous 
people living in Halls Creek and required that:
• children attend school every day and on time, 
and parents are actively involved in their 
children’s education
• children and those who are vulnerable are cared for 
and safe
• capable adults participate in training or work
• people abide by the conditions related to their tenancy 
in public housing—that they maintain their homes and 
pay their rent
• communities tackle issues of domestic violence, 
alcohol and drug offences.
Such a low engagement rate in developing these 
community requirements makes it hard to justify the 
claims of ‘community support and participation’ made 
in the scoping study. Further, of this 2.35%, 29.4% of 
participants disagreed with the full model to impose 
the five key requirements and related sanctions (Wunan 
Foundation 2012:39). This limited consultation and 
overlooking of broad Indigenous agency and deliberation 
(what Sen calls process freedoms) have significant 
implications regarding the claims of Indigenous-led 
development—firstly, because the conclusions drawn 
may not necessarily align with the majority of people’s 
aspirations and values, and, secondly, because the 
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five requirements set to be imposed have not been 
deliberated and yet are portrayed as widely accepted.
Reviving the capability approach to 
Indigenous policy in Australia
What I have argued so far is that the capability approach 
implies that all members of society should be able to 
choose between valuable capabilities. This approach 
differs from more punitive and paternalistic measures 
that call for people to adapt their preferences to existing 
opportunities or, in the case of Australia, the aspirations 
of dominant settler society (Bonvin 2012).
The capability approach is inherently plural and can 
contribute to and shape Indigenous policy in Australia. 
While some critics of the capability approach have 
argued that it neglects issues of power, hegemony and 
neoliberalism, I agree with Sayer (2012) that stopping 
at such a critique and failing to marry the merits of the 
capability approach with critical social theory undermines 
the contribution that the capability approach could make 
to effective Indigenous policy in Australia.
The capability approach can guide Indigenous social 
policy in six areas. The first two are welfare-to-workfare 
and labour force activation strategies, which are 
increasingly the direction in which Indigenous policy is 
focused. The final four areas are broader avenues for 
further policy and research.
Analysing welfare-to-workfare policies
The capability literature shows how the push for 
welfare-to-workfare policies is counterintuitive in terms 
of supporting wellbeing. Firstly, workfare policies 
assume that the capability to work in the market 
economy is the essence of Indigenous wellbeing, 
overlooking the plethora of other possible capabilities 
essential for wellbeing (Bonvin 2012). This is not to say 
that no Indigenous people want to work in the market 
economy—of course, some do and should be free to 
do so. The point being made here is a different one, 
specifically commenting about the process in which 
policy is designed to get all Indigenous people into the 
mainstream labour market.
Secondly, the assumption behind welfare-to-workfare 
policies is that welfare dependency undermines people’s 
will to work. This has certainly been argued by Pearson 
(2000:21) who, when considering Indigenous people 
and welfare, stated that ‘dependence on passive 
welfare is our most urgent problem’. Pearson calls 
welfare ‘passive’ because he sees people on welfare 
not being required to reciprocate the right to social 
security—especially in finding other alternatives such as 
mainstream employment. The distinction made earlier 
between human capital and human capabilities relates 
to this approach to workfare, particularly since the 
capability approach:
… does not privilege one option over the others ... It 
contends that the very process of defining the scope 
and content of work is a matter of social choice that 
is to be settled in a context-specific way, and not in 
absolute or universal terms. (Bonvin 2012:12)
Thirdly, the use of behavioural requirements attached 
to welfare and associated tools, such as compulsory 
income management, used for those who fail to meet 
such conditions, is also not consistent with the capability 
perspective. According to Bonvin (2014:10):
If people’s values or preferences are to be taken 
seriously, then all constraining approaches coinciding 
with the imposition of certain programs or measures 
on non-compliant beneficiaries may be considered 
as problematic in a capability perspective.
Behavioural requirements relating to state assistance and 
sanctions aim to correct deficient and devious agency 
through restricting choice. The focus of Bonvin in the 
above passage is on perceived dysfunction needing 
to be corrected, all the while overlooking the agency 
people undertake to negotiate the world around them. 
These policies neglect not only the process elements of 
freedom but also the opportunity aspect and substantive 
freedoms people can enjoy, by restricting the options 
they can achieve based on the behavioural conditions 
set. Behavioural requirements on state assistance and 
sanctions also problematise the individual through what 
Robeyns (2005) calls a methodological individualism 
lens, which only looks at the individual and neglects 
any examination of the social arrangements that exist 
or do not exist to explain the individual. For example, 
behavioural requirements enforced by the government—
such as that children must go to school—neglect to 
consider the failure of the educational and learning 
environments provided by schools and the state 
(Kral 2008, 2012 ).
Analysing activation policies
Activation strategies are initiatives and incentives 
to nudge and push people towards specific policy 
outcomes. In the case of Australian Indigenous policy, 
activation strategies are used in employment and 
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education. In the era of neoliberalism, activation policies 
are couched in an ‘implicit and undisputed view of what 
objectives responsible individuals should pursue … 
acting responsibly coincides with getting people back 
to work as quickly as possible’ (Bonvin 2008:367). One 
way in which activation is used in Australian Indigenous 
policy is in employment and training, where policy aims 
to ‘activate’ Indigenous people into specific jobs and 
training. For example, a national review of Indigenous 
training and employment has now recommended that all 
training available to Indigenous people across Australia 
must be in line with industry needs (Forrest 2014). This 
approach is especially problematic for Indigenous 
people living in remote communities where employment 
opportunities are severely limited or non-existent (Altman 
2015). Moreover, from a capability perspective, several 
more issues concern activation strategies—strategies 
that incentivise mainstream employment and training. 
Firstly, and as addressed earlier, such an approach 
restricts the kinds of capabilities and functionings people 
can get in training to those only in line with human capital 
needs according to the market, which may or may not be 
valued by the agent. This is not to say that capital-related 
capabilities are not valued, but, because there is no 
deliberation, they exclude some capabilities—especially 
those held valuable by people living remotely on country. 
The capability approach shows how these employment 
activation strategies are not sufficient because they do 
not take into account meaningful or valued work, which 
may or may not be inside the market economy. Secondly, 
it is problematic to enforce people into industry-specified 
jobs that have precarious conditions, such as workers 
being exposed to the full brunt of global economic 
forces (Carpenter et al. 2007, Standing 2011). Thirdly, 
the capability to work should include an ‘exit’ option, 
whereby the worker has an option to leave a degrading 
working situation, with dignity intact (Bonvin 2012).
Development as human flourishing, not 
economic growth and integration
The capability approach has the ability to challenge 
outdated and restrictive definitions of development 
in Australia. It maintains that expanding valued 
capabilities is the purpose of development, and that 
institutions (including the state and economy) should 
only exist to support capabilities that people value 
or have reason to value. Sen’s normative evaluative 
framework, however, holds that wellbeing is diverse (a 
plurality of capabilities) and is committed to institutions 
supporting process freedoms in the realisation of valued 
capabilities. The capability approach could support the 
creation of institutions leading towards Indigenous self-
determination. This could include the ability to recognise 
the diverse meanings of Indigenous development, where 
Indigenous people actively take part in defining their own 
paths of development. These may include traditional 
and on-country livelihoods, language, spirituality and 
connection to country, as well as the ability to organise 
governance structures and representative bodies.
Creating context-specific policy formations 
that regard Indigenous agency as central
Contemporary Australian Indigenous policy tends to 
direct interventions guided by the deficit discourse, 
where it is assumed that agency is deficient, concurrently 
justifying the promotion of paternalism and top-down 
approaches. The alternative is context-specific policy 
formations valuing the plurality of wellbeing, which 
challenge the perception of ‘Indigenous people’ as a 
homogeneous group. In reality, nothing is more obvious 
when considering ‘Australian Indigenous people’, 
or ‘Aboriginal communities’, than the diversity and 
heterogeneity of the Indigenous peoples in Australia 
(Sullivan 1996). Yet state officials currently seem to 
engage with only a selected few Indigenous individuals 
and organisations, assuming that they speak on behalf of, 
or know better than, the wider population. The capability 
approach provides a way to work through this exclusive 
and top-down managerial approach, an approach 
that is often at the expense of individual and collective 
process freedoms. Because it requires deliberation and 
democratic freedoms, the capability approach can help 
avoid individualisation, wherein actors use their privileged 
position to prevail over all others. Instead, the capability 
approach requires ‘that the construction of public 
interventions is to be achieved via the confrontation of a 
plurality of informational bases and normative references’ 
(Bonvin 2014:12). In other words, the capability 
approach requires public deliberation in the formation 
and execution of policies with actors that are directly 
impacted by the policy.
Making the means as important as the ends
Another area where the capability approach could 
contribute to Indigenous policy in Australia is in 
rebalancing the relationship between the means and 
the ends of policy. Currently, policy is outcome focused 
(ends), and the process of getting to such outcomes 
is overlooked and undervalued. This is a concern 
because, as already identified in this paper, the agency 
of Indigenous people is overlooked and undervalued, 
resulting in what many would argue as top-down, 
paternalistic policies. Instead, the capability approach 
places agency (means) at the centre of the development 
process, where public deliberation and involvement 
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in the policy-making process is paramount. Within 
the capability approach, the policy-making process 
has intrinsic and instrumental significance in terms of 
people’s ability to have more control over their lives. By 
overlooking Indigenous agency, policy can completely 
exclude Indigenous people in its formation, rendering 
the policy questionable and disempowering the people it 
should serve.
Creating multidimensional measures 
of Indigenous wellbeing
The capability approach can provide a framework 
for thinking about particular measures of Indigenous 
wellbeing. The aim of the capability measures would 
be to identify capabilities over functionings—that is, 
what people can choose to do (ability) over what they 
actually do (achievement of outcomes). Measures should 
also be multidimensional in character, where particular 
capabilities are selected for context-specific ideas of 
wellbeing put forward by Indigenous people themselves. 
Identifying the capabilities to be measured should be 
negotiated through public deliberation. Robeyns (2003) 
sets out basic criteria for selecting capabilities:
• An explicit list is compiled that is publicly deliberated 
and defended.
• The methods used to draw up a list must be 
scrutinised and justified.
• The capabilities must be sensitive to the context, 
making clear the abstraction at which the list 
is pitched.
• Lists are checked to ensure that the capabilities 
listed cannot be reduced to other elements 
or misinterpretations.
The methodology employed by Yap and Yu (2014) is an 
example of selecting capabilities. Through placing the 
process freedoms of the Yawuru people of Broome at the 
centre of their research, they are developing culture- and 
gender-sensitive indicators of wellbeing.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to address the use of the 
capability approach in some parts of Australian 
Indigenous policy. To do this, I firstly reviewed and 
clarified the important concepts of freedom, agency and 
pluralism according to capability scholars, and showed 
how these concepts do not support the use of individual 
responsibility and the imposition of basic capabilities, as 
claimed by Pearson. I then suggested six areas in which 
the capability approach could be used to support future 
Indigenous policy making in Australia: analysing welfare-
to-workfare and activations policies, reconfiguring 
development as human flourishing and not economic 
growth/integration, creating context-specific and agency-
honouring policy, and developing multidimensional 
measures of Indigenous wellbeing and agency.
Complementary with critical social theory, the capability 
approach could provide a suitable normative framework 
to guide policy to support Indigenous development. 
Shifting such a paradigm would be a helpful step in 
refocusing the public policy process and institutions 
on Indigenous wellbeing (as a heterogeneous concept) 
as the normative goal. The shift required on the part of 
the state and related institutions to support the plural 
approach to development will need a concerted effort 
by state agencies to move towards capability-centred 
policies. It will also need an openness and willingness to 
analyse the way in which power, isolation and oppression 
undermine policy and, most importantly, the freedoms of 
Indigenous Australians.
Notes
1. Sen (2005) has even problematised the primacy of 
formal school education as a fundamental capability in 
development discourse. Alkire (2002) shows how Sen has 
a wider view of education beyond technical literacy and 
numeracy—one that incorporates different world views 
and knowledge systems that may challenge the dominant 
development discourse. Nevertheless, Sen should not be 
interpreted as dismissing the need for education, health 
or other capabilities—he rejects prioritising particular 
capabilities and states that the freedom to articulate 
capabilities is as important as their achievement.
2. The scoping study shows the sampling size of the study as 
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